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I. INTRODUCTION 
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s path-breaking article, A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law, advances a dual thesis: first, that 
team production theory does a better job than its competitors (in particu-
lar, principal–agent theory) of explaining the advantages of the public 
corporation and key features of corporate law; and second, that, as a mat-
ter of corporate law, corporate boards are charged with advancing the 
collective interest of all the contributors to the corporate enterprise rather 
than the shareholders’ interests alone.1 Its central insight is that the role 
of the independent, or insulated, corporate board is to serve as a “mediat-
ing hierarch” among the contributors to firm value.2 As new crises of 
corporate accountability over the past decade have been met with poli-
cies centered on corporate boards and shifts in the balance of power 
within the corporation, these propositions have moved beyond the acad-
emy and into the center of policy debates on the nature and purpose of 
corporate law.3 
This Article looks back at Team Production Theory and considers 
its implications for the governance of global multinational enterprises 
(MNEs). It argues that team production problems in fact arise at multiple 
levels within global firms and that, therefore, team production theory, as 
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benefitted greatly from the insights of the Berle VI Symposium participants. 
 1. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 247, 255–56 (1999). 
 2. See id. at 253. Blair and Stout use the term “independent” board not to refer to one com-
posed largely or entirely of independent directors, but rather to what other commentators have re-
ferred to as an “insulated” board: one with the discretion to act independently of the shareholders. 
See Lucian Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1637 (2013) (referring to the “insulated board”). 
 3. The literature addressing the board-centric and stakeholder-oriented dimensions of their 
arguments are vast. The poles of the debate were recently surveyed by Delaware Chief Justice Leo 
E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better By Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideo-
logical Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (2014). 
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well as principal–agent theory, is necessary to explain MNE governance. 
Admittedly, Blair and Stout’s work focuses on public corporations, most 
of which are global firms, and their work also assumes that shareholders 
and other contributors to the corporate enterprise are both individuals and 
legal entities. However, in order to more simply articulate how corporate 
governance rules reflect a team production approach, their account de-
picts the corporation as a freestanding legal entity formed by a team of 
(real) people and governed by a single board as the intermediary between 
the shareholders, managers, and other constituencies.4 
In actuality, as they acknowledge,5 the firm is not a single legal en-
tity, but is instead a complex economic organization, or corporate group, 
composed in some cases of hundreds or thousands of legal entities, not 
all of which adopt the corporate form. The corporate group is typically 
defined by a parent corporation’s ownership or control of the equity of 
direct and indirect subsidiaries, each with a separate legal identity.6 For 
corporate groups that operate globally, the distinct legal entities that 
comprise the MNE have characteristics defined by their jurisdiction of 
incorporation, which may differ from the jurisdiction of the corporate 
parent. 
Given these realities, Blair & Stout’s conclusions raise several in-
teresting questions when applied to the MNE and other complex corpo-
rate groups. First, where do team production problems arise within the 
MNE? Even limiting the scope of the inquiry to corporate entities, does 
team production theory account for governance rules only of parent cor-
porations, or of subsidiaries as well? Does the answer depend on the 
functional role of the entity? How does team production theory inform 
firm governance if there are multiple “mediating hierarchs” within a cor-
poration? Which board(s) within the MNE are “mediating hierarchs”? 
Although Blair and Stout advanced team production theory as the best 
explanation of the governance of the publicly held Berle–Means firm, 
might team production dynamics also dominate in non-Berle–Means 
firms, such as controlled entities within the MNE, where principal–agent 
theory might be expected to apply most directly? If the public corpora-
tion should instead be viewed as a unitary enterprise, which stakeholders 
                                                            
 4. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 280 fig.2 (depicting the structure of a single corpo-
ration). 
 5. See Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2003, 
2006 (2013) (noting that leading work on the theory of the firm has treated the public company as 
little different from small, closely held companies). 
 6. The corporate group does not have independent legal status under state corporate law. See 
Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate Groups: Corporate Identity Reconceived, 42 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 879, 886 (2012). 
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should be viewed as the contributors to the corporate enterprise? The 
ultimate, local stakeholders of the firm’s affiliates, dispersed around the 
globe, the affiliate entities themselves, or perhaps only the immediate 
constituencies of the ultimate corporate parent within its jurisdiction? 
The answers to these questions have important theoretical and prac-
tical implications. First, at the level of theory, the strand of corporate 
governance scholarship dealing with the relationship between sharehold-
ers and management typically focuses on the rights of dispersed share-
holders in the public corporation, and so does not consider the role of 
directors and officers of the firm’s subsidiaries and other affiliates. 7 
Similarly, corporate governance rules protecting minority shareholders 
assume that controlled subsidiaries will generally behave as mere agents 
following the dictates from the peak of the corporate pyramid.8 In either 
case, agency relationships, rather than the contracting problems associat-
ed with team production, necessarily dominate. However, if team pro-
duction theory is limited to the boards of publicly traded corporations at 
the helm of the corporate group, then corporate law is of less relevance 
within the MNE, and it is less clear that team production theory outpaces 
principal–agent theory at either a descriptive or predictive level. We 
might expect, though, that if team production theory best explains corpo-
rate law, its basic rationales should hold regardless of whether the corpo-
ration is a free-standing entity, incorporated within a given state, or is 
affiliated with other entities as part of a larger firm. Second, as discussed 
below,9 corporate law is more ambiguous with regard to the corporate 
objective function of subsidiaries than of parent entities, so the evidence 
presented here that subsidiary boards also serve as mediating hierarchs 
lends support for Blair and Stout’s more general claim about the funda-
mental stakeholder-oriented nature of corporate law.10 
Finally, if corporate boards at different levels within the MNE serve 
as mediating hierarchs, then subsidiary boards and their relationships 
with one another and with their parent(s) take on greater importance 
                                                            
 7. Corporate scholarship has tended to focus on either the agency conflict between the firm’s 
shareholders and its managers (the parent level of the public corporation) or on the agency conflict 
between controlling and minority shareholders (the subsidiary level of the firm), but rarely on the 
two as a whole. On the agency problems that ground corporate law, see John Armour, Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 35, 36 (Reiner Kraakman et al. 
eds., 2d ed. 2009). 
 8. The heightened duty of entire fairness protects the minority from exploitation by the control-
ling shareholder when the subsidiary board cannot establish its decisional independence. See, e.g., 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 9. See infra Part III.B. 
 10. See Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 315. 
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within corporate law. Of course, many subsidiaries are formed in order to 
achieve a certain tax status, facilitate a specific transaction, or play an 
otherwise passive role in the MNE; in these cases, the subsidiary board, 
if it exists at all, forms a largely place-holding function. However, recent 
work by management and strategy scholars has identified a range of sub-
sidiary roles with varying degrees of autonomy and authority within the 
MNE. These studies find that the horizontal relationships and roles of 
affiliates may in fact be more important to firm value than vertical par-
ent–subsidiary relationships.11 Traditional understandings of global firms 
as simple hierarchies, characterized by unidirectional, top-down govern-
ance and control, have given way to organizational structures that shift 
flexibly between hierarchy and “heterarchy.”12 This complexity and its 
implications for firm governance and regulation have not been well ex-
amined in the legal literature. 
This Article responds by extending Blair and Stout’s work explicit-
ly to the MNE—a project that necessarily involves multiple dimensions. 
The first, taken up in Part II below, is to unpack findings from strategic 
management and organizational theory to better understand the organiza-
tional structure of these complex global firms. The second, which is the 
focus of Part III, is to consider how team production theory applies to 
organizations that exhibit “multiplex” governance, that is, firms with 
multidimensional, multijurisdictional, and intersecting governance struc-
tures. In these firms, there are multiple, overlapping principal–agent rela-
tionships and coordination among them may require the cooperation of 
multiple mediating hierarchs. This complexity suggests that greater at-
tention should be directed toward the role of subsidiary boards and man-
agement. 
A full treatment of the implications of these findings for corporate 
law, or for the broader regulation of global firms, is beyond the scope of 
this paper. However, this Article contributes to that effort by laying a 
foundation for further research. It concludes by suggesting areas in 
which legal rules might better reflect these organizational changes in 
                                                            
 11. See, e.g., Alan Rugman, Alain Verbeke & Wenlong Yuan, Re-conceptualizing Bartlett and 
Ghoshal’s Classification of National Subsidiary Roles in the Multinational Enterprise, 48 J. MGMT. 
STUD. 253 (2011) (finding that horizontal relationships matter more than vertical ones); Kendall 
Roth & Allen J. Morrison, Implementing Global Strategy: Characteristics of Global Subsidiary 
Mandates, 23 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 715 (1992) (analyzing subsidiary roles in coordination and central 
control). See also infra Part III. 
 12. The term “hierarchy” refers to the role of organization and internal contracting as an alter-
native to external markets. See, e.g., OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS & HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS 
AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975). On the distinctions between hierarchical and heterarchical 
organizational structures, see infra Part II.B. 
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global firms and identifying remaining questions regarding MNE struc-
ture. The role of active subsidiary boards within the MNE deserves 
greater attention from scholars of U.S. corporate law, given the number 
of U.S. firms that are targeted by foreign acquirers or that are undertak-
ing inversion transactions that introduce a foreign parent corporation but 
retain operational control in a U.S. subsidiary, not to mention the domi-
nant role that many U.S. subsidiaries play within global MNEs. 
Like Blair and Stout’s work, this Article limits its focus to the role 
and function of corporate entities and their boards, even though corporate 
groups also include noncorporate business entities. However, this inquiry 
differs from Blair and Stout’s work in two important ways: by examining 
the internal governance of the MNE, it considers the extent to which 
team production theory applies to nonpublic corporations and to wholly 
or partially controlled corporations that are part of, but are not them-
selves, Berle–Means corporations. This effort confirms Blair and Stout’s 
observations that team production problems are ubiquitous and that they 
arise within firms with different, and perhaps more concentrated, owner-
ship characteristics.13 
II. MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AS ORGANIZATIONS 
At a fundamental level, Blair and Stout’s work resonates so power-
fully, fifteen years later, because it contributes to our understanding of 
how and why organizational structures, such as the corporate board, mat-
ter in the firm and how these structures both reflect existing law and 
shape its future development. Blair and Stout demonstrate, for example, 
that the historical emphasis on principal–agent theory as a primary lens 
for understanding corporate law has led to an emphasis on vertical gov-
ernance relationships—shareholders and boards, directors and officers—
while team production theory emphasizes horizontal relationships among 
the contributors to the corporate enterprise.14 A second insight of rele-
vance to the governance of corporate groups is their observation that the 
corporation’s separate legal personality makes it a political, as well as an 
economic, actor, and one with internal and external power relations.15 
As discussed below, the emerging literature on MNE governance 
confirms these intuitions. It makes clear that MNE organizational struc-
tures have now evolved beyond the simple hierarchies that corporate law 
scholarship often assumes. As organizational forms change, principal–
                                                            
 13. See Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 256. 
 14. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 269–70. 
 15. Id. at 257, 323–24. 
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agent theory and property-based conceptions of the firm remain relevant, 
but in today’s global firms, contractual, lateral, relational, and organic 
intrafirm ties are as important as hierarchical incentive and control struc-
tures in effective firm governance.16 In this context, team production the-
ory offers a richer understanding of the governance of these large, global 
firms. This Part begins by exploring how MNEs differ from the Berle–
Means firm and where corporate law matters within the MNE. It then 
explains how the structural evolution of MNEs renders team production 
problems more common within the firm and subsidiary governance more 
important. 
A. Global Corporate Groups & the Berle–Means Firm 
The evolution and dominance of MNEs worldwide offers some of 
the most compelling evidence of the advantages of the corporate form.17 
As it happens, however, the Berle–Means corporation, which is the focus 
of Team Production Theory, represents only a subset of the corporations 
that make up large global firms. In the Berle–Means firm, widely dis-
persed ownership creates a separation of ownership and control between 
the shareholders and the board of directors, which is charged with man-
aging the corporation.18 Within the MNE, only constituent entities of the 
firm that are publicly traded or otherwise held by widely dispersed 
shareholders may be characterized as Berle–Means corporations. These 
corporations are most often positioned at the level of the ultimate parent, 
but may also be subsidiaries elsewhere within the corporate structure. In 
addition, concentrated ownership structures that do not fit the Berle–
Means paradigm are typical outside the United States;19 yet, even within 
the United States, changing ownership patterns and governance shifts 
that empower shareholders suggest that the Berle–Means corporation is 
more a paradigm than a description of the dominant U.S. corporate gov-
ernance model.20 
Again, in the United States and in most other jurisdictions, the cor-
porate group is typically defined by a parent corporation’s ownership or 
                                                            
 16. See infra Part III. Blair and Stout likewise acknowledge that hierarchical governance in 
corporations is important, in part in streamlining decisionmaking and as a means of mediating hori-
zontal disputes among team members. See Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 264. 
 17. See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
 18. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
 19. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 
737 (1997). 
 20 . On the changes in ownership patterns, see generally MATTEO TONELLO & STEPHEN 
RABIMOV, THE CONFERENCE BD., 2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT 22 tbl.10 (2010). 
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control of other direct and indirect subsidiaries, each with a separate le-
gal identity.21 Although common equity ownership is not the only means 
for the parent corporation to exercise control over its affiliates, nor is 
equity ownership the only way for firms to benefit from cooperative eco-
nomic activity; the parent corporation at each tier of the corporate group 
often owns a whole or controlling interest in its immediate subsidiaries.22 
Many foreign jurisdictions require the incorporation of a formal subsidi-
ary, and the firm may elect to do so as a matter of overall strategy or for 
tax or regulatory reasons. 
Within this structure, the firm’s headquarters serves as the seat of 
direction, control, and coordination, or as the “nerve center” of the 
firm.23  Many firms establish multiple headquarters in addition to the 
global or corporate headquarters.24 One study of 21,000 U.S. headquar-
ters found that the average firm in the study had fifteen different head-
quarters.25 Not every entity that owns equity in another affiliate of the 
firm also functions as a headquarters, and the ultimate parent (and its 
board) may not be associated with the same legal entity as the corporate 
headquarters. For example, over sixty percent of Fortune 500 firms are 
incorporated in Delaware, but only two are also headquartered there.26 In 
addition, a parent entity may be a holding company without any opera-
tional or oversight role,27 or it may be an intermediate subsidiary itself 
that nonetheless serves as a global, regional, or divisional headquarters. 
The function and role of the headquarters and subsidiaries are discussed 
in Part III, infra. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the 
                                                            
 21. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 22. Harper Ho, supra note 6, at 887–88. 
 23. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92 (2010) (defining the “principal place of business” 
for jurisdictional purposes). 
 24. For a definition of the corporate headquarters, see infra notes 88–89 and accompanying 
text. 
 25. See Vanessa Stauss-Kahn & Xavier Vives, Why and Where Do Headquarters Move?, 39 
REGIONAL SCI. & URBAN ECON. 168 (2009) (analyzing headquarters relocation decisions for 30,000 
U.S. firms between 1996 and 2001). 
 26. These figures are reported by the Delaware Sec’y of State, Div. of Corps., Why Businesses 
Choose Delaware, STATE OF DELAWARE, http://corplaw.delaware.gov/eng/why_delaware.shtml (last 
visited Aug. 21, 2014). Information on corporate headquarters was obtained from the Dun & Brad-
street Hoovers database, at http://www.hoovers.com (last visited Aug. 21, 2014). I follow the man-
agement literature here and use the term “headquarters board” to refer to the board with direct over-
sight of the corporate headquarters. 
 27. Prechel & Boles define the holding company as “an entity with a small centralized admin-
istrative office that is in a position to control one or more other corporations by virtue of ownership 
of their securities.” Harland Prechel & John Boles, Capital Dependence, Financial Risk, and Change 
from the Multidivisional to the Multilayered Subsidiary Form, 13 SOC. F. 321, 352 (1998). 
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term “parent” simply refers to the position of an entity within the corpo-
rate structure, not to its functional role. 
Another challenge in extending Team Production Theory to the 
MNE is that MNEs are, by definition, corporate groups that operate 
transnationally, and no single corporate law (or other regulatory) regime 
governs the firm as an enterprise.28 Therefore, any treatment of the role 
of corporate governance within the global firm must consider the limits 
and reach of domestic corporate governance rules. In particular, U.S. 
state law, whether of Delaware or another state of incorporation, will 
only govern the internal affairs of the specific entity incorporated within 
the state. If this entity holds functional authority over the firm as a 
whole, serves as a regional or divisional headquarters, or otherwise over-
sees other subsidiaries, then state corporate law will directly or indirectly 
govern the affiliates under its control.29 This influence will be more lim-
ited if the U.S. corporation has no intermediate role and is controlled by 
a corporation formed in a foreign jurisdiction. 
Finally, corporate law’s reach within the firm is limited to the gov-
ernance of legal entities. Firms may instead elect to organize their opera-
tions into divisions, which have no independent legal status unless they 
are also formally incorporated as a subsidiary. By forming or acquiring a 
subsidiary instead of forming a division, a firm has chosen to constitute a 
new legal entity, and if that entity is a corporation, a corporate board. A 
subsidiary board may be required by foreign listing rules or by other lo-
cal regulations, although there is wide variation in local legal require-
ments, the autonomy given to the board, and the strategic considerations 
that may drive the decision to create a subsidiary board where one is not 
legally required.30 As a result, the resolution of team production prob-
lems within the MNE may depend not only upon the headquarters board, 
but also on the intermediation of the subsidiary board or of local man-
agement. 
While concentrated share ownership distinguishes the MNE from 
the Berle–Means corporation, the corporate governance of MNEs (and 
other corporate groups) cannot be usefully analogized to the closely held 
corporation. This is because each corporation within the group is, itself, a 
legally independent firm capable of owning its own assets, is governed 
                                                            
 28. See supra note 6. 
 29. See Virginia Harper Ho, Of Enterprise Principles and Corporate Groups: Does Corporate 
Law Reach Human Rights?, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 113 (2013) (arguing that the application 
of the internal affairs doctrine to a parent entity gives state corporate law enterprise-wide reach). 
 30. See Yadong Luo, How Does Globalization Affect Corporate Governance and Accountabil-
ity?, A Perspective From MNEs, 11 J. INT’L. MGMT. 19, 23–24 (2005). 
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by its own board and management, possesses unique informational capi-
tal that is not known to its shareholders, and is responsible for maintain-
ing its own factors of production. Unlike closely held corporations, in 
which there is no separation of ownership and control, most corporate 
groups have multiple ownership tiers with varying degrees of equity con-
trol over subsidiaries. Moreover, because the formal authority of the par-
ent firm may not equate to real authority over the subsidiary, vertical 
agency problems remain to a far greater extent than in the closely held 
firm, and even controlled lower-tier subsidiaries may enjoy some degree 
of functional autonomy.31 
In sum, corporate boards are positioned both within the global firm 
at various subsidiary levels, as well as at the level of the ultimate par-
ent(s) of the corporate group. This complexity creates the prospect that 
corporate boards may emerge as the mediating hierarchs of team produc-
tion at multiple “nodes” of authority within the firm. As discussed below, 
the formal structure of the firm as an organization and the existence of a 
corporate board at multiple tiers of the organization does not diminish 
the role of corporate boards at the headquarters or ultimate parent level in 
shaping strategy and decisionmaking, nor does it ignore the importance 
of hierarchical control within MNEs. Nonetheless, the diversity of role, 
authority, and power of the entities that comprise the corporate group is 
precisely what motivates an understanding of team production at the firm 
level as the coordination of organizations, not only individuals, and the 
role of multiple corporate boards in that process. 
B. Evolving Firm Structures: Beyond Hierarchy & Heterarchy 
Historically, research on the emergence and comparative advantage 
of modern MNE structures has drawn on the same paradigms considered 
by Blair and Stout in their analysis of fundamental corporate governance 
rules: principal–agent theory, property perspectives, and contract-based 
theories. The agency literature emphasizes the hierarchical nature of the 
firm’s internal governance structures and the ex ante agency costs needed 
to align incentives and monitor performance at each level of the princi-
                                                            
 31. As various contributors to this symposium noted, degrees of board independence and 
shareholder control are not dictated by entity form, but rather reflect a continuum in which owner-
ship structure is but one factor. See also Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, Formal and Real Authority 
in Organizations, 105 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1997) (distinguishing formal and real authority and their 
sources). Similarly, the subsidiary’s formal authority to control its assets may not reflect the real 
authority of a controlling parent to dominate subsidiary decisionmaking. See id. at 2 (noting the 
limits of authority conferred by asset ownership). 
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pal–agent chain.32 Theories of the firm based on transaction cost eco-
nomics similarly explain its emergence as a result of the efficiencies de-
rived from hierarchical control over the factors of production relative to 
external markets.33 Other literature emphasizes property rights, defining 
the firm as a portfolio of assets that it owns or controls.34 These concep-
tions focus on the advantages of asset specification and risk shielding 
offered by the corporate form,35 but, as Margaret Blair has noted in other 
work, theories of the firm have only recently recognized the importance 
of information as a key asset of the firm, and one that may be transferred 
laterally or from the bottom of the organization as much as from the top-
down.36 
Much of the corporate governance literature rests on a number of 
related assumptions that build on these views of the firm, all of which 
focus attention on the ultimate parent of a corporate group. The first is an 
assumption that MNEs and other large firms adopt primarily pyramidal 
structures based on chains of dyadic principal–agent (i.e., parent–
subsidiary) relationships.37  Subsidiary governance is of less interest be-
cause the (ultimate) parent level is where strategy is set and where ulti-
mate decisionmaking authority lies. The MNE, therefore, can be viewed 
largely as a unitary organization under central coordination. The second, 
related assumption is that principal–agent theory best explains internal 
firm governance. As long as the parent corporation respects the separate 
legal identity of its subsidiary, appropriate monitoring and incentives are 
in place to reduce agency costs, and the subsidiary board treats any mi-
nority owners fairly, controlled subsidiary boards contribute to the corpo-
                                                            
 32. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 33. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: 
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985) (Williamson’s explanation of the origins of 
the firm draw on Ronald Coase’s seminal work). See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the 
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 34. See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory 
of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 693 (1986). 
 35 . See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 40–62 (1991) (discussing these rationales); see also Mike Geppert & Christoph 
Dorrenbacher, Politics and Power Within Multinational Corporations: Mainstream Studies, Emerg-
ing Critical Approaches and Suggestions for Future Research, 16 INT’L. J. MGMT. REV. 226, 228 
(2014) (discussing gains to the MNE from control over specialized assets). 
 36. See Margaret M. Blair, Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Gregg Kirchhoefer, Outsourcing, Modu-
larity, and the Theory of the Firm, 2011 BYU L. REV. 263, 276–79 (2011). 
 37. For example, cases articulating the fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders and related 
commentary necessarily focus on specific binary control relationships between the parent and its 
subsidiary, or, in the case of common control, between the parent and each affiliate. See, e.g., Kahn 
v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994) (discussing controlling shareholder 
fiduciary duties). 
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rate enterprise by following the marching orders of their parent.38 Both of 
these assumptions challenge a team production approach. They also sug-
gest that corporate law may speak to the majority–minority shareholder 
agency conflict, but will otherwise have little else to say to subsidiary 
boards. Finally, corporate law scholarship has largely assumed that the 
Delaware corporation is the publicly traded, ultimate parent of the corpo-
rate group, and therefore, that the governance of the firm can be under-
stood solely with reference to state corporate law, rules on U.S. exchang-
es, and federal securities law with little reference to foreign corporate 
and securities laws or listing requirements. 
However, since the 1990s, international management scholars have 
observed a shift in that field “away from a dyadic, hierarchical view of 
the MNC headquarters and its subsidiaries, toward a perspective in 
which the multinational organization is viewed as a web of diverse, dif-
ferentiated inter- and intra-firm relationships.”39 This literature recogniz-
es the MNE as a hybrid organizational form that merges elements of 
market and hierarchy.40 Various theories of the relationship among MNE 
headquarters and subsidiaries have also emerged that share a common 
focus on the lateral relationships within corporate groups.41 These find-
ings suggest that corporate governance and accountability structures 
within global firms are responses to the internal contracting and coordi-
nation problems that are at the core of team production theory. 
1. The Emergence of the Multidivisional Form 
The economic historian Alfred Chandler has traced the emergence 
of the modern corporate form in the 1800s to the massive technological 
developments of the late nineteenth century.42 Throughout the early part 
                                                            
 38. On the application of veil-piercing doctrine to the corporate group, see Harper Ho, supra 
note 6, at 889–90. On the entire fairness standard, see supra note 8. In fact, the prospect of entire 
fairness review may actually encourage subsidiary board independence. See infra note 152 and ac-
companying text. 
 39. Sharon W. O’Donnell, Managing Foreign Subsdiaries: Agents of Headquarters or an 
Interdependent Network?, 21 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 525, 526 (2000) (surveying the literature). 
 40. See Sharon Belenzon, Andrea Patacconi & Bennet Zelner, The Nebulous Nature of the 
Firm: An Empirical Study of Corporate Group Structure in 16 Developed Economies, at 1–2 (Sept. 
5, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites& 
srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxhbmRyZWFwYXRhY2Nvbml8Z3g6MTgxYzE0OGY1NzFmN
GVmMQ. (This conclusion follows from prior work recognizing the market dynamics within firms.) 
See, e.g., George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of 
Firms, Collateral and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102 
(2004). 
 41. See infra Part III. 
 42. Chandler observed that the expansion of railroads necessitated organizational changes, 
namely the emergence of hierarchical organizational forms capable of managing a complex system 
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of the twentieth century, corporate groups were primarily organized in a 
centralized “U-form” or unitary structure, with functional departmentali-
zation but centralized management, or alternatively, in holding company 
(“H-form”) structures.43 Because the holding company is simply a corpo-
rate shell, both structures retained centralized operational control. This 
concentration of operational management at the central level resulted in 
management overload and cumbersome and incomplete contracting. 
Both proved inefficient as firms grew larger and more complex.44 
In response, as Williamson explains, DuPont and General Motors 
developed an “M-form” (i.e., multidivisional) structure with “semiauton-
omous operating divisions . . . organized along product, brand, or geo-
graphic lines”; central executives were responsible for strategy, resource 
allocation, and monitoring, while divisions handled operational matters.45 
In M-form organizations, the headquarters is responsible for identifying 
“separable economic activities within the firm; . . . according quasi-
autonomous standing  [to each]; . . . . awarding incentives; . . . allocating 
cash flows to high-yield uses,” conducting strategic planning, and moni-
toring the performance of all divisions.46 Each corporate division, unlike 
a subsidiary, is not a separate legal entity but is instead an operating unit 
contained within the parent corporation. Although it may have its own 
officers, or in some cases, even a divisional board, because it is not in-
corporated, it cannot issue stock or own its own assets. As Williamson 
explains, “[t]he M-form structure is thus one that combines the 
divisionalization concept with an internal control and strategic decision-
making capability”; operational decisionmaking, generally of a short-
term nature, occurs at the divisional level, while long-term strategic 
decisionmaking occurs at the headquarters.47 
Other major corporations followed the lead of DuPont and GM, and 
the M-form was eventually adapted to manage diversified assets through 
the conglomerate, and to foreign direct investment through the MNE.48 
By the 1970s, studies of MNE management were emphasizing the role of 
                                                                                                                                     
in a way that market transactions could not do. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 33, at 274–75 (present-
ing Chandler’s conclusions). As Williamson relates, transaction costs, rather than technology itself, 
drove pressure for railroads to develop a coordinated hierarchy through contract to manage new, 
complex networks. Id. at 295. 
 43. Williamson’s account of the emergence of the integrated firm referenced here and follow-
ing draws heavily on Chandler’s work. Id. at 280–81 (citing ALFRED D. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND 
STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 38–83 (1962)). 
 44. WILLIAMSON, supra note 33, at 280, 295. 
 45. Id. at 281. 
 46. Id. at 284. 
 47. Id. at 284 (emphasis in original). See also id. at 296. 
 48. Id. at 296. 
2015] Team Production & The Multinational Enterprise 511 
headquarters and the centralization of power in the MNE.49 Throughout 
the 1980s, as well, studies continued to portray MNE structures as formal 
hierarchies under the control of a central board.50 
2. Beyond Hierarchy & Heterarchy 
The M-form MNE remains the dominant organizational form in the 
United States.51 However, by the late 1990s, studies found a decline in 
the use of the M-form and a shift toward a multi-level subsidiary form.52 
This trend represents a change in the formal ownership and governance 
structure of the firm, because unlike divisions, subsidiaries are legally 
distinct corporations. As such, they are capable of owning separate pools 
of assets, shielding the parent from liability, and facilitating enterprise-
level risk management.53 Again, subsidiaries are also headed by a board 
of directors, while remaining under the control of the corporate parent. 
Subsidiarization therefore creates the potential for multiple boards to fa-
cilitate coordination, control, and conflict resolution within the MNE. 
In addition to the shift toward more widespread use of subsidiary 
forms, the 1990s also saw the emergence of alternative conceptions of 
the MNE that emphasized “heterarchy” over hierarchy.54 Various models 
emerged as scholars began to see the M-form hierarchy as too simplistic 
to capture how MNEs really worked 55 : the “multifocal firm,” 56  the 
                                                            
 49. See Geppert & Dorrenbacher, supra note 35, at 227. 
 50. Kirsten Foss, Nicolai J. Foss & Phillip C. Nell, MNC Organizational Form and Subsidiary 
Motivation Problems: Controlling Intervention Hazards in the Network MNC, 18 J. INT’L MGMT. 
247, 248–49 (2012) (surveying the literature). 
 51. See Markus Menz, Sven Kunishch & David J. Collis, What Do We Know About Corporate 
Headquarters? A Review, Integration, and Research Agenda 1 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper 
No. 14-016, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2316198 (citing 
a 2004 study reporting that the M-form accounted for sixty percent of output in the U.S.). 
 52. See Prechel & Boles, supra note 27, at 328, 351–52 (“[R]esearchers continue to assume 
that firms have the same [multi-divisional] form that was introduced in the 1920s.”). This study was 
based on data from the top 100 public companies between 1987 and 1993. See id. Prechel and Boles 
note that subsidiarization is a cheaper way to obtain control over assets and suggest that the shift 
may have been prompted by tax reform in the 1980s that encouraged restructuring to capture these 
efficiencies. See id. at 333–34. 
 53. Id. at 353. 
 54. Foss et al., supra note 50, at 5–6 (surveying this literature). See generally Gunnar Hedlund, 
The Hypermodern MNC—A Heterarchy?, 25 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 9 (1986) (distinguishing the 
two and identifying intersections). 
 55. See also Foss et al., supra note 50, at 249 (surveying the literature); Sumantra Ghoshal & 
Christopher A. Bartlett, The Multinational Corporation as an Interorganizational Network, 15 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 603 (1990) (surveying the literature). 
 56. See generally C.K. PRAHAHLAD & YVEZ DOS, THE MULTINATIONAL MISSION: BALANCING 
LOCAL DEMANDS AND GLOBAL VISION (1987). 
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interorganizational network, 57  the geocentric model, 58  the “matrix” 
firm,59 and the federated firm.60 All of these terms emphasize the pres-
ence of multiple centers of information, control, and coordination. In 
heterarchical firms, “resources, managerial capabilities, and 
decisionmaking [power] are dispersed throughout the organization, rather 
than concentrated at the top,” lateral relationships among subsidiaries are 
encouraged, and “activities are coordinated along multiple dimensions, 
typically geography, product and function.”61 In addition, these firms 
“strongly delegate[d] decision rights to subsidiaries, while retaining 
some [decision rights] at the [headquarters]. [They are] often character-
ized by a low degree of formalization, extensive lateral communication, 
and knowledge transfer.”62 As Andersson, Forsgren, and Holm observe, 
in heterarchical or networked firms, the headquarters is “one player 
among others,” which cannot unilaterally exercise its authority, but must 
balance the influence and power of subsidiaries.63 
More recent work calls for an integrated approach that recognizes 
the complexity of modern corporate organizations. On the one hand, in-
ternational management scholars observe the “emergence and diffusion 
of more decentralized and less formalized ‘network forms’ of the [MNE] 
. . . in response to increased dynamism and heterogeneity in [MNE] envi-
ronments.”64 Others emphasize that MNEs are in fact dynamic power 
structures that can shift between hierarchy and heterarchy across differ-
ent business areas and contexts, as well as over time, as subsidiary opera-
tions expand and mature.65 This dynamism is fueled only in part by top-
down directives from the headquarters. Instead, subsidiaries themselves 
are often sources of entrepreneurship, innovation, and “mandate 
                                                            
 57. See Ghoshal & Bartlett, supra note 55. Other authors have used the term “differentiated 
network” to describe similar features of MNE structures. See, e.g., NITIN NOHRIA & SUMANTRA 
GHOSHAL, THE DIFFERENTIATED NETWORK: ORGANIZING MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS FOR 
VALUE CREATION (1997). 
 58. See H.V. Perlmutter, The Tortuous Evolution of the Multinational Corporation, COLUM. J. 
WORLD BUS., Jan.–Feb. 1969, at 8–18 (coining this phrase). 
 59. See generally Hedlund, supra note 54. 
 60. See Ulf Andersson, Mats Forsgren & Ulf Holm, Balancing Subsidiary Influence in the 
Federative MNC: A Business Network View, 38 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 802 (2007). 
 61. Julian M. Birkinshaw & Allen J. Morrison, Configurations of Strategy and Structure in 
Subsidiaries of Multinational Corporations, 26 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 729, 737 (1995). 
 62. Foss et al., supra note 50, at 249. 
 63. Andersson et al., supra note 60, at 808. 
 64. Foss et al., supra note 50, at 248. 
 65. Hedlund, supra note 54, at 12–20, 23–24. See also Geppert & Dorrenbacher, supra note 35, 
at 230 (noting that heterarchy is determined in part by the “strategic choices and roles of subsidiar-
ies, which cannot be fully controlled by the [headquarters]”). 
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change.”66 Although certain resources and core functions, such as fi-
nance, legal, and human resource functions, remain centralized in many 
firms,67 coordination and centralization of function can happen at the 
subsidiary level (which may or may not be a publicly traded corpora-
tion), not only at the level of the ultimate parent.68 Because technological 
integration has facilitated multiple centers of leadership and integrated 
decisionmaking structures, multiple regional and even global headquar-
ters may have overlapping areas of authority and power. 
This reality stands in clear contrast to the centralized, vertical, prin-
cipal–agent model of decisionmaking in the hierarchical firm. Organiza-
tional scholars have also recognized “the trade-offs between multiple 
stakeholders and multiple perspectives” within the MNE.69 These devel-
opments confirm that team production problems arise at all levels of the 
firm. They also suggest that subsidiary boards might have a role to play 
in mediating the explicit and implicit contracts among their sharehold-
er(s) and other firm constituencies. 
III. MEDIATING HIERARCHS & MULTIPLEX GOVERNANCE 
As Blair and Stout explain, team production problems arise when 
“1) several types of resources are used[;] . . . 2) the product is not the 
sum of the separable outputs of each cooperating resource[; . . . and] 3) 
not all resources used in team production belong to one [contributor].”70 
From this perspective, the “public corporation is a team of people who 
enter into a complex agreement to work together for their mutual gain.”71 
However, the core challenge of team production is that, because the 
product of their collective effort is joint and nonseparable, team members 
cannot allocate the output of team production in advance in a way that 
incentivizes optimal contributions by each team member to the collective 
enterprise.72 The formation of the corporation therefore requires that the 
contributors to the corporate enterprise voluntarily contract to cede con-
                                                            
 66. See Julian Birkinshaw, How Multinational Subsidiary Mandates are Gained and Lost, 27 J. 
INT’L. BUS. STUD. 467 (1996) (defining mandate change as the scope of responsibilities of the sub-
sidiary beyond its national market). 
 67. See Andreas Schotter & Paul W. Beamish, Performance Effects of MNC Headquarters–
Subsidiary Conflict and the Role of Boundary Spanners: The Case of Headquarter Initiative Rejec-
tion, 17 J. INT’L MGMT. 243 (2011) (referring to these cross-firm functions as “boundary spanners” 
that promote integration within the MNE). 
 68. O’Donnell, supra note 39, at 541; Roth & Morrison, supra note 11, at 718. 
 69. See Geppert & Dorrenbacher, supra note 35, at 227. 
 70. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Or-
ganization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779 (1972), adapted in Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 265. 
 71. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 278. 
 72. See id. at 266–69. 
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trol over the enterprise outputs and their own firm-specific inputs to an 
authority or “hierarch” that is independent of the team members. In the 
corporation, this role is filled by the board of directors.73 
The contributors agree to this arrangement in order to secure the 
cooperation and firm-specific investments of the other contributors, 
which would be difficult to obtain if they believed that the board was not 
insulated from the shareholders, putting their investments at risk of ex-
propriation.74 Team production theory therefore offers a useful explana-
tion for why corporate law gives boards of directors so much discre-
tion.75 The answer, in short, is that corporate law views corporate direc-
tors as trustees, not agents of the shareholders. Instead, the board is the 
“mediating hierarch” among all of the contributors to the corporate en-
terprise, who contract implicitly and explicitly for the benefits provided 
by the board’s oversight, coordination, and strategy setting.76 Important-
ly, the presence of the corporate board also creates a procedural mecha-
nism for resolving costly conflicts among team members.77 Accordingly, 
incentivizing mutually beneficial contracting, constraining shareholder 
opportunism, and limiting shirking or rent-seeking by other team mem-
bers become the key challenges of corporate law, rather than minimizing 
agency costs. Indeed, Blair and Stout acknowledge that the team produc-
tion approach may in fact increase agency costs.78  
MNEs are complex organizations that coordinate deployment of 
capital across national borders where contributors of other critical in-
puts—such as labor capital, local knowledge centers, and natural re-
sources—are located. Thus, they engage in team production almost by 
definition. They do so by harnessing the corporate form at multiple levels 
of the firm’s structure precisely because the corporate form offers partic-
ular advantages that incentivize team production, including the limited 
liability of each affiliate and asset partitioning. Limited liability incentiv-
izes the parent’s investment in the subsidiary by limiting its risk of loss, 
and asset partitioning facilitates the investments of the parent and subsid-
iary creditors by enabling specialized monitoring of collateral and “bun-
                                                            
 73. See id. at 276–77. 
 74. Id. at 277–78; Stout, supra note 5, at 2016. 
 75. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 253. 
 76. Id. at 276–79. “Rather, the directors are trustees for the corporation itself—mediating 
hierarchs whose job is to [preserve] the productive coalition . . . .” Id. at 280–81 (emphasis added). 
 77. Id. at 278. 
 78. Id. at 253, 255. 
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dling” of discrete contractual claims (as well as assets and liabilities) for 
more efficient future transfer.79 
Most critically from a team production perspective, the corporate 
form also provides capital lock-in. Capital lock-in isolates the assets of 
the corporation in a separate legal entity that is subject to external mar-
kets and various creditor protections, such as legal restrictions on divi-
dends, fraudulent conveyance law, and the like. These limits incentivize 
other contributors to make firm-specific investments to the subsidiary 
because they constrain ex ante the controlling shareholder’s ability to 
deplete corporate assets at the expense of other contributors to the corpo-
rate enterprise. 80  Kenneth Ayotte has argued that this feature of the 
subsidiarization decision is also directly tied to innovation; when firms 
create separate subsidiaries to house assets associated with specific new 
ventures, unit managers not only have greater decisional independence, 
but also have stronger incentives to invest in the commercialization of 
the assets. Creating a separate entity signals that the parent does not have 
competing uses for the assets and is less likely to interfere in the pro-
ject.81 Subsidiarization is therefore value-enhancing to both the subsidi-
ary and the larger firm precisely because the legal independence between 
the parent and its subsidiary facilitates team production. 
When the firm forms a corporate subsidiary, state corporate law in 
the United States and domestic corporate law in other host jurisdictions 
typically mandate that to achieve these benefits, the corporation must 
form a board as its governing body. This choice has legal consequences, 
some of which encourage a greater degree of subsidiary board independ-
ence. Consistent with veil-piercing doctrine, the subsidiary board must 
play at least a formal functional role, because the parent must respect the 
legal independence of its affiliates.82 In addition, in related party transac-
                                                            
 79. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational 
Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2001). On contract bundling, see Henry Hansmann & Kenneth Ayotte, 
Legal Entities as Transferable Bundles of Contracts, 111 MICH. L. REV. 715 (2012) (emphasizing 
that free transferability incentivizes the parent company’s investment in the subsidiary). Separate 
legal personhood and the ability to hold ownership interests in other entities are the other defining 
characteristics of the corporation that are essential to the existence of the corporate group. Harper 
Ho, supra note 6, at 884–86, 948. 
 80. See Margaret Blair, Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Or-
ganizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 427 (2003) These protections apply more 
weakly in wholly owned subsidiaries. See infra notes 148–149. 
 81. In short, this structure may reduce the risk of parent shareholder opportunism. See Kenneth 
Ayotte, Subsidiary Entities and the Innovator’s Dilemma 2–3 (Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, 
Working Paper No. 2012-017, 2011), available at https://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-
faculty/searlecenter/workingpapers/documents/Ayotte_Subsidiary_Entities_Innovators_Dilemma. 
pdf. 
 82. See supra note 38. 
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tions, courts give business judgment rule deference to subsidiary boards 
that establish their decisional independence.83 Although the actual func-
tions of these boards vary widely, the global firm, therefore, emerges as a 
“multiplex” governance system with multidimensional, multi-
jurisdictional, and intersecting internal governance structures. Explaining 
these systems from a corporate governance standpoint adds complexity 
to Blair and Stout’s foundational account. 
Most obviously, in the modern firm, the key contributors to the 
corporate enterprise include not only individuals, but entities. In Alchian 
and Demsetz’s original work on team production theory, the corporate 
board’s relationship to the other firm constituents is analogous to the hub 
and spokes of a wheel; the mediating hierarch is a single common con-
tracting party to a set of bilateral contracts.84 Once the MNE is under-
stood as an integrated firm of firms, however, its management and gov-
ernance must take account of the relationships among multiple teams and 
multiple hierarchs. If each constituent entity’s board mediates the contri-
butions of its own constituencies or team members, then the modern firm 
must be viewed not as a single team, but more accurately as a team of 
teams. 
Wherever there are multiple principals, coordination and other team 
production issues become paramount. As John Armour and colleagues 
have previously noted, coordination challenges intersect with agency 
problems. Specifically, coordination challenges make principals more 
likely to delegate decisionmaking to agents, but delegation increases 
monitoring and related agency costs.85 Although subsidiaries are not le-
gally agents of their immediate parent, the complexity of relationships 
among affiliates within the corporate group may cause a subsidiary board 
to exercise a role as a mediating hierarch even as it remains subject to 
some degree of control by its parent or one or more affiliates. This ex-
pectation is borne out by evidence, discussed below, of the functional 
role of many subsidiary boards.86 
One apparent challenge to a team production account of MNE gov-
ernance is that, under Blair and Stout’s approach, “team members volun-
                                                            
 83. See Gantler v. Stevens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). More recent case law now authorizes 
business judgment rule review of certain transactions involving controlling shareholders if certain 
procedural mechanisms are in place to safeguard the independence of the subsidiary board’s approv-
al. See Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (en banc), aff’g In re MFW 
S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 84. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 70, at 794; cf. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 269–70 
(critiquing Alchian and Demsetz’s work for its focus on vertical principal–agent relationships). 
 85. Armour et al., supra note 7, at 37. 
 86. See infra notes 111–113 and accompanying text. 
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tarily choose to submit themselves to the hierarchy as an efficient ar-
rangement that furthers their own self-interest.”87 In contrast, with the 
exception of acquisitions, subsidiaries may be created unilaterally by 
their parent-shareholder, which also determines their authority and au-
tonomy, at least initially. In other words, these subsidiary boards can be 
expected to act much more like agents because they are generally not 
insulated from their shareholder(s) to the same extent that the board of 
the MNE ultimate parent is insulated from its shareholder(s).  
However, as discussed below, team production rationales still apply 
within the MNE even though subsidiary boards lack the autonomy of the 
headquarters or public company board. In part, this is because the team 
members of the subsidiary and the headquarters are not identical. From a 
team production standpoint, the function of subsidiary boards is to incen-
tivize the firm-specific contributions of its own (local) constituents and 
its shareholder-parent. In contrast, the function of the headquarters board 
is to motivate the firm-specific contributions of each team in a way that 
will maximize overall firm value for the enterprise as a whole. 
A final observation about the extension of team production theory 
to the MNE is that corporate governance within the firm takes diverse 
forms. Some subsidiaries serve a passive role, governed by hierarchical 
controls that comport more with principal–agent theory and property-
based understandings of the firm. This is particularly true for wholly 
owned subsidiaries and those with a high degree of board interlock, 
where subsidiary directors are also executives or directors of the parent. 
Other subsidiary boards serve critical coordination and control functions 
and behave more like trustees than agents. In addition, the degree of au-
thority or autonomy that subsidiaries enjoy is often a matter of formal or 
informal contract rather than fiat.  
This Part draws on the considerable literature from within strategic 
management, particularly from international management studies, that 
sheds light on the pervasiveness of team production dynamics and the 
diverse governance and functional relationships within the MNE. It be-
gins by considering the mediating role of headquarters boards and then 
the circumstances under which subsidiary boards may fit within a team 
production model.  
                                                            
 87. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 254 n.17. See also id. at 274 (“[T]eam members submit to 
hierarchy not for the hierarch’s benefit, but for their own.”). 
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A. Headquarters Boards 
Blair and Stout’s account of a corporate board that is independent, 
or insulated, as a matter of corporate law from its widely dispersed 
shareholders fits most closely as an account of the governance of the 
“corporate” or global headquarters of the corporate group.88 The corpo-
rate headquarters may be defined as the “entity at the top of a firm that 
assumes responsibility for functions like strategic planning, corporate 
communications, tax, legal, marketing, finance, human resources and 
information technology. . . . [and] includes the CEO . . . and top-
management team . . . .”89 As management scholars have observed, the 
primary role of the headquarters is “to organize effectively the idiosyn-
cratic sets of value added activities distributed among national subsidiar-
ies”—in other words, to serve as a mediating hierarch among multiple 
contributors to the success of the global enterprise.90 Large MNEs also 
have multiple business unit headquarters organized around divisional, 
geographic, or functional lines.91 Expanding research on the diverse roles 
of regional headquarters in recent years emphasizes their power and con-
tribution to MNE value, regardless of their formal status as subsidiaries 
lower down in the corporate network.92 Regardless of their position with-
in the MNE, these headquarters boards are responsible for centralized 
decisionmaking within their scope of authority.93 
The board of the ultimate parent of the MNE enjoys the right to de-
termine its organizational structure and, therefore, the scope of authority 
of any subsidiaries. These decisions are a core part of corporate strategy 
that often carry important tax and regulatory consequences.94 This power 
                                                            
 88. See Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 276–81. Although the ultimate parent and the corporate 
headquarters are often one and the same, this is not always the case. 
 89. Foss et al., supra note 50, at 247 n.1. 
 90. Rugman et al., supra note 11, at 274 (citing the case of Nestle as a firm with multiple man-
agement models, even in a single country). 
 91. See Julian Birkinshaw et al., Why Do Some Multinational Corporations Relocate Their 
Headquarters Overseas?, 27 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 681, 686 (2006) (noting that some of these are 
publicly traded, while others are wholly owned subsidiaries of a higher-level entity within the corpo-
rate structure). 
 92. See Francesco Ciabuschi et al., The Role of Headquarters in the Contemporary MNC, 18 J. 
INT’L MGMT. 213 (2012) (introducing a series of studies on the roles and functions of headquarters 
within the MNC). 
 93. Again, a headquarters of a public corporation may be formally a subsidiary board rather 
than the ultimate parent of a Berle–Means firm. 
 94. Foss et al., supra note 50, at 250 (noting that organizational structure and control are inte-
gral to creating incentive structures); Yan Du, Marc Deloof & Ann Jorissen, Active Boards of Direc-
tors in Foreign Subsidiaries, 19 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 153 (2011) (identifying the 
strategic use of subsidiary boards). Subsidiaries that are noncorporate pass-through entities for tax 
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derives directly from the decisional rights conferred by corporate law, 
namely the right of shareholders to control the corporate board.95 There-
fore, even in network or heterarchical MNEs, the headquarters holds ul-
timate rights of fiat relative to its subsidiaries.96 
At first blush, the power of the headquarters to define the corporate 
structure and unilaterally form a subsidiary in which it holds a control-
ling equity interest might suggest that the existence and authority, if any, 
of subsidiary corporate boards is strictly a matter of delegated authority 
governed by core agency principles rather than a voluntary contract 
among firm contributors as described by Blair and Stout.97 However, 
from a team production perspective, the decision to form a separate legal 
entity is itself beneficial in incentivizing firm-specific contributions to 
the subsidiary and the enterprise.98 
Even if done unilaterally, these decisions are also inherently con-
tractual and must take into account the incentives of the employees, 
managers, creditors, other stakeholders of the subsidiary, as well as other 
affiliates who contribute resources to the success of the MNE. Corporate 
law gives the parent control rights and enforcement rights over its sub-
sidiary, but, in exchange, the parent agrees to assume fiduciary duties to 
any minority shareholders, to contribute its initial investment in the as-
sets of the subsidiary, and perhaps to provide or subsidize certain central-
ized administrative functions for the subsidiary. The formation of a sub-
sidiary by the parent shareholder also involves explicit contracting with 
the incorporating jurisdiction’s government and with minority investors 
in the subsidiary, as reflected in the subsidiary charter. If the subsidiary 
is acquired, the scope of the subsidiary’s authority post-closing raises 
even more obvious team production questions about the appropriate allo-
cation of joint output and is therefore explicitly negotiated to take into 
account the interests of employees, managers, key suppliers and custom-
ers, and other constituents to induce them to continue to make firm-
                                                                                                                                     
purposes are widely used within MNEs but are not the focus of Blair and Stout’s work, which is 
concerned solely with explaining the comparative advantages of the corporate form. 
 95. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 293–94. Blair and Stout  observed that key features of cor-
porate law (in Delaware) that appear to preference shareholders, such as derivative litigation, voting 
rights, and fiduciary duties should be understood as inuring to the benefit of the corporation as a 
whole, while giving shareholders the instrumental role of using these mechanisms to promote or 
preserve value in the corporation for the benefit of all its stakeholders. Id. 
 96. Foss et al., supra note 50, at 249. 
 97. This Article does not assume that all headquarters have this power; for example, the global 
headquarters as shareholder-parent may have reserved the right to veto or approve the formation or 
acquisition of subsidiaries at the regional headquarter level. 
 98. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
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specific investments that will increase value to the subsidiary and its 
shareholder(s). 
Most importantly, the decision to constitute a corporate board at the 
subsidiary level encourages firm-specific investments at the subsidiary 
level by introducing an important source of monitoring and control that 
can discourage shirking or rent-seeking by the local and global contribu-
tors to the MNE.99 In fact, this authority is essential to the board’s role in 
avoiding unnecessary internal and external transaction costs, coordina-
tion failures, and negative externalities.100 To maintain the power to ex-
ercise these rights, the headquarters must reduce agency costs, which it 
does through market-based mechanisms such as interlocking directorates, 
the use of independent directors, and cross-shareholdings, as well as 
through managerial performance incentives, information systems, codes 
of conduct, internal audits, and cultural and social ties across the firm.101 
Blair and Stout’s core claim is that the allocation of decisionmaking con-
trol to corporate boards and the determination of the scope of board over-
sight are themselves part of the implicit contract among the team mem-
bers and are critical to the efficiency advantages of the corporate form.102 
This logic applies with equal force to the MNE as well. 
B. Subsidiary Boards 
Part of the challenge in conceptualizing MNE governance is that 
the formal structure of global firms says little about their function as or-
ganizations. Over the past several decades, however, leading studies in 
international strategic management have expanded understandings of the 
diversity of subsidiary roles that provide clear evidence of the important 
roles subsidiaries and their boards play in resolving team production 
problems. These studies observe that the internal and external resources 
of the subsidiary—including its geographic location, competencies, posi-
tion and integration within the MNE, and its innovation—can determine 
the subsidiary’s power, authority, and autonomy within the interdepend-
                                                            
 99. On the monitoring function of the subsidiary board, see infra notes 142–146 and accompa-
nying text. The creation of a subsidiary board also allows for the participation of independent direc-
tors, which can provide additional assurance to team members. 
 100. Foss et al., supra note 50, at 249–50. 
 101. See Yadong Luo, Corporate Governance and Accountability in Multinational Enterpris-
es: Concepts and Agenda, 11 J. INT’L. MGMT. 1, 6–11 (2005) (discussing these mechanisms); Mat-
thias Mahlendorf et al., Influencing Foreign Subsidiary Decisions Through Headquarter Perfor-
mance Measurement Systems, 50 MGMT. DECISION 688 (2012). 
 102. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 322. 
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ent MNE network and, therefore, its role or “mandate.”103 Consistent 
with a team production approach, subsidiaries add value by developing 
subsidiary-specific advantages that can become firm-specific advantages 
for the MNE, and several studies have found that their power is strongest 
when they make firm-specific contributions to the MNE that are recog-
nized by the headquarters.104 
To be sure, MNE governance depends on the ability of the head-
quarters to effectively coordinate the contributions of the MNE’s affili-
ates, align affiliate incentives to achieve the headquarters’ goals, and 
generally achieve effective integration among its divisions and affiliates. 
Because of the information asymmetries between subsidiaries and corpo-
rate headquarters and the complexity created by the dual embeddedness 
of the subsidiary both locally and within the MNE, understanding how 
MNEs reduce agency costs is a dominant focus of international manage-
ment scholars.105 
However, the diversity and power of subsidiaries suggests a number 
of limits of agency theory that have already been explored in the strategic 
management literature.106 Most critically, agency theory “assumes a sim-
ple, dyadic, hierarchical relationship between headquarters and the . . . 
subsidiary[, which] often is not the case.107 Instead, subsidiary–parent or 
subsidiary–headquarters relationships within the firm are defined by the 
presence of multiple principals and multiple agents, depending on the 
relationship in question.108 In addition, agency theory assumes subsidiary 
opportunism should be restrained; however, opportunism is, in fact, often 
a valuable source of innovation for the firm.109 These observations echo 
                                                            
 103. Rugman et al., supra note 11, at 254 (surveying the literature and developing a new 
framework). See also Geppert & Dorrenbacher, supra note 35, at 230–31 (identifying internal rela-
tionships within the MNE, external relationships with stakeholders, and its ability to leverage these 
resources as a source of power in the subsidiary); Ulf Andersson, Mats Forsgren & Ulf Holm, Bal-
ancing Subsidiary Influence in the Federative MNC: A Business Network View, 38 J. INT’L. BUS. 
STUD. 802 (2013); Alan M. Rugman & Alain Verbeke, Subsidiary-Specific Advantages in Multina-
tional Enterprises, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 237 (2001). 
 104. Rugman & Verbeke, supra note 103, at 243–47; Geppert & Dorrenbacher, supra note 35, 
at 226; Julian Birkinshaw, Neil Hood & Stefan Jonsson, Building Firm-Specific Advantages in Mul-
tinational Corporations: The Role of Subsidiary Initiative, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 221 (1998). 
 105. See, e.g., Luo, supra note 30, at 22–23 (reviewing this literature). 
 106. See O’Donnell, supra note 39, at 542 (finding that measures of intrafirm interdependence 
offer better predictors of foreign subsidiary control than agency theory). 
 107. Id. at 541. See also Yvez Doz & C.K. Prahalad, Managing DMNCs: A Search for a New 
Paradigm, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 145, 149 (1991) (surveying dominant theoretical views). 
 108. O’Donnell, supra note 39, at 542 (“[S]ubsidiary managers have a web of relationships 
with different managers, both at headquarters and at other foreign subsidiaries.”). 
 109. See Sumantra Ghoshal & P. Moran, Bad for Practice: A Critique of the Transaction Cost 
Theory, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 13, 38 (1996) (“[O]pportunism is difficult to distinguish ex ante 
from entrepreneurship and leadership . . . .”). 
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Blair and Stout’s critique of the oversimplification of principal–agent 
theory. As they point out in Team Production Theory, principal–agent 
theory misses the reality that information flows, control, and even the 
choice about the scope of the agents’ autonomy, is not unidirectional. 
The agent may, in fact, have an informational advantage over the princi-
pal, which can allow it to inform or direct the principal.110 
Because many MNEs are characterized by “decentralized centrali-
zation,” where activities are globally integrated but managed by the sub-
sidiary instead of by headquarters,111 the coordinating and monitoring 
functions typically exercised by corporate headquarters are often in fact 
centered at a local or regional level instead of (or also) at the global lev-
el.112 Recent empirical studies observe that corporate headquarters are 
increasingly electing to allocate certain headquarters or “corporate” func-
tions to dispersed affiliates and are blurring the dividing lines between 
the corporate and operating unit levels.113 Subsidiaries may also play a 
role in obtaining access to resources, which is another function typically 
associated with the headquarters.114 Team production theory, therefore, 
usefully describes not only the role of headquarters boards, but the role 
of at least some subsidiary boards as well. 
The subsidiary board is uniquely positioned to serve as a mediating 
hierarch because it is simultaneously embedded both within the MNE 
and in its local context. Indeed, the subsidiary board must constantly 
strike a balance between local adaptation and integration with the larger 
firm of which it is a part,115 balancing the expectations of multiple head-
quarters and affiliates and, depending on its role, some mix of local and 
global stakeholders.116 This type of coordination by subsidiary boards 
encourages the subsidiary’s team members to continue to make firm-
specific investments in the subsidiary and directly or indirectly in the 
MNE as a whole. 
                                                            
 110. See Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 258–59. 
 111. Birkinshaw & Morrison, supra note 61, at 734 (describing the “active” or “world man-
date” subsidiary). 
 112. Rugman et al., supra note 11, at 273; Ciabuschi et al., supra note 92, at 216; O’Donnell, 
supra note 39, at 541 (noting that centralization of function can occur at the subsidiary level). Be-
cause most of these studies focus on foreign, rather than domestic, subsidiaries, they may identify, 
on balance, higher degrees of subsidiary autonomy than would be found in higher-tier domestic 
subsidiaries. 
 113. Menz et al., supra note 51, at 25 (reviewing this literature). 
 114. See Birkinshaw et al., supra note 104. 
 115. Foss et al., supra note 50, at 249. See also Klaus E. Meyer, Ram Mudambi & Rajneesh 
Narula, Multinational Enterprises and Local Contexts: The Opportunities and Challenges of Multi-
ple Embeddedness, 48 J. MGMT. STUD. 235 (2011). 
 116. Luo, supra note 30, at 24. 
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However, there is considerable variation in the degree to which the 
subsidiary board has the capacity to function as an independent mediat-
ing hierarch within the MNE in the same way as a parent or headquarters 
board.117 Subsidiary boards may be formed solely as a legal formality, 
with the parent retaining full direct control over the subsidiary. Such 
boards are typically composed entirely of local managers or parent exec-
utives, who may also report to senior management of the parent corpora-
tion.118 If a formal board is not legally required, the parent may elect to 
retain full control over the subsidiary CEO and management, but consti-
tute an advisory board to improve information exchange and monitoring 
at the subsidiary level.119 Other subsidiary boards, described by Kiel et 
al. as “dual reporting” boards, have greater responsibility for local over-
sight and strategy by virtue of a clear division of authority between the 
subsidiary and parent boards. In these firms, local CEOs report both to 
the subsidiary board and to the parent board or management.120 Finally, a 
subsidiary board may have full local autonomy and authority over the 
subsidiary, and perhaps other affiliates, while still being accountable for 
its financial performance and other outcomes to the shareholder-
parent.121 
Limited research has been done to determine the prevalence of the-
se different models for different jurisdictions, industries, and ownership 
structures, and precise measures are difficult to find.122 However, some 
generalizations can be made. For example, subsidiaries that are wholly 
owned will be controlled by the parent and generally composed largely 
or entirely of its executives.123 In contrast, subsidiaries that are strategi-
cally important, large (relative to the MNE), or tasked with global re-
sponsibility are more likely to have an active or autonomous board.124 
This is illustrated by many of the recent inversion transactions, which 
result in a formerly U.S.-domiciled corporation being reincorporated 
                                                            
 117. See Geoffrey C. Kiel, Kevin Hendry & Gavin J. Nicholson, Corporate Governance Op-
tions for the Local Subsidiaries of Multinational Enterprises, 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 
568, 572–74 (2006) (discussing archetypal approaches). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 573. 
 120. Id. at 572–73. 
 121. Id. at 574. 
 122. A notable recent exception is Belenzon et al., supra note 40. However, even this study 
does not focus on the particular function of subsidiary boards. 
 123. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (detailing composi-
tion of the controlled subsidiary board). 
 124 . See Du et al., supra note 94, at 155–56, 160. This study also suggests that Anglo-
American firms may make use of subsidiary boards less frequently than firms headquartered else-
where. See id. at 160. 
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abroad, but often retaining the original corporate headquarters at the 
(newly constituted) subsidiary level.125 Numerous studies have found that 
the boards of international joint ventures play active roles in setting strat-
egy, monitoring performance, accessing resources, resolving conflict, 
and coordinating with parent corporations.126 
Whether team production, property, or principal–agent rationales 
best describe the role and authority of the subsidiary and its board de-
pends not only on the subsidiary’s position within the MNE, but also on 
the particular functional role at issue and the characteristics of the given 
subsidiary or parent entity.127 For example, subsidiaries with global au-
thority (known as “global” or “world mandate” subsidiaries in the litera-
ture) often have direct responsibility for worldwide product management 
and also play a greater role in central control.128 Other subsidiary boards 
may operate under tighter central control and serve largely as advisors on 
local strategy.129 
Since the early 2000s, empirical studies have also demonstrated 
how changes in information technology and internal coordination have 
allowed subsidiaries across geographic and jurisdictional boundaries to 
simultaneously assume passive and active roles for different functional 
activities. For example, a national subsidiary might be a “strategic lead-
er” for the MNE with regard to sales activities but play a passive role in 
R&D innovation.130 As a result, a single subsidiary may serve as a head-
quarters with respect to an administrative function, such as regional 
compliance, as a passive asset with respect to local resources and rela-
tionships, and as a passive agent with respect to certain production func-
tions.131 Functions involving greater financial commitments, global strat-
                                                            
 125 . See DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., R43568, 
CORPORATE EXPATRIATION, INVERSIONS & MERGERS: TAX ISSUES 2–3 (2014) (describing common 
inversion structures). 
 126. See Igor Filatochev & Mike Wright, Agency Perspectives on Corporate Governance of 
Multinational Subsidiaries, 48 J. MGMT. STUD. 471, 479 (2011) (reviewing this literature). 
 127. See, e.g., Birkinshaw & Morrison, supra note 61 (identifying a typology of subsidiary 
strategies: the “local implementer,” “specialized contributor,” and “world mandate” subsidiaries). 
See also Bongjin Kim, John E. Prescott & Sung Min Kim, Differentiated Governance of Foreign 
Subsidiaries in Transnational Corporations: An Agency Perspective, 11 J. INT’L MGMT. 43 (2005) 
(arguing for differentiated corporate governance of foreign subsidiaries based on their strategic 
roles). 
 128. Roth & Morrison, supra note 11, at 716, 718, 720. 
 129. One early study in the 1980s found that North American subsidiaries with active boards 
tended to serve in this more limited role and that subsidiary boards were generally underutilized. See 
Mark P. Kruger, The Increasing Role of Subsidiary Boards in MNCs: An Empirical Study, 9 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 347 (1988). 
 130. Rugman et al., supra note 11, at 255–56 (surveying the literature). 
 131. See Hedlund, supra note 54, at 21. 
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egy or coordination, higher risk, or standardization will require greater 
involvement or control at higher-tier headquarters.132 The greater the au-
tonomy of the subsidiary with respect to broad corporate functions or 
strategy, the more likely its board is to serve as a trustee or mediating 
hierarch;133 the less its autonomy with regard to a given function, the 
more the subsidiary will resemble an agent of the affiliate (not necessari-
ly the corporate parent) that has authority and autonomy with respect to 
that function. 
The dynamic, negotiated nature of the subsidiary–headquarters rela-
tionship itself confirms the utility of team production theory as applied to 
the MNE, as well as the need for a more complex understanding of the 
nature of team production in complex organizations. Empirical studies of 
subsidiary autonomy, which examine the extent of their strategic and 
operational decisionmaking authority, offer the clearest evidence of these 
interactions. 134  These studies observe that at the headquarters level, 
boards and senior management must weigh the tradeoffs between subsid-
iary control and autonomy: high autonomy makes direct monitoring 
more difficult and less effective, but it facilitates subsidiary responsive-
ness to local conditions and more efficient use of subsidiary resources.135 
Traditional tools used to tighten control and reduce agency costs, such as 
incentives and monitoring, can discourage value-adding collaborations 
among affiliates within the MNE network or even generate resistance to 
headquarters.136 In addition, headquarters may be unable or unwilling to 
exercise full control via top-down incentives and monitoring, particularly 
in subsidiaries that result from mergers or acquisitions.137 
                                                            
 132. See Tomasz Golebiowski, Positioning of Foreign Subsidiaries in Multinational Enterprise 
Network: Does the Local Embeddedness Matter?, 14 J. ECON. & MGMT. 36 (2013) (identifying 
factors that determine the division of roles and power among corporate headquarters and foreign 
subsidiaries). 
 133. As Aghion and Tirole’s seminal work notes, factors that increase the real authority of a 
subordinate may be broadly observed within MNE subsidiaries; these include the span of the subsid-
iary’s range of control, the presence of multiple principals, and the ability of its superior to utilize 
performance measurement as a remote monitoring strategy. See Aghion & Tirole, supra note 31, at 
27. 
 134. O’Donnell, supra note 39, at 528. 
 135. See id. at 528, 537, 540 (finding support for this hypothesis and concluding that as auton-
omy increases, there is less monitoring by headquarters). See also Yvez Doz & C.K. Prahalad, Pat-
terns of Strategic Control Within Multinational Corporations, 15 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 55, 55–58 
(1984) (discussing this tradeoff). 
 136. O’Donnell, supra note 39, at 542. O’Donnell notes that alternative social controls, such as 
greater integration within the MNE, are often more costly. Id. Foss et al. note that hierarchical, bu-
reaucratic internal controls are rigid and restrain flexibility, adaptation, and innovation, and may 
block information transmission to the headquarters. Foss et al., supra note 50, at 24–25 (discussing 
the negative effects of headquarters intervention). 
 137. See Geppert & Dorrenbacher, supra note 35, at 233–37. 
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Importantly, the degree of autonomy and the subsidiary’s role are 
not only “formally conferred by the [headquarters], [but are] also (infor-
mally) driven by the subsidiary’s internal bargaining power”138—in other 
words, the subsidiary’s role may be “assumed” as well as “assigned.”139 
Maximizing local resources and power gives the subsidiary greater au-
tonomy, but the subsidiary must also contribute value to the enterprise or 
lose the authority and mandate conferred on it by the headquarters.140 As 
local environments or subsidiary conditions change, the power dynamic 
shifts, which effectively requires a renegotiation of the subsidiary’s rela-
tionship to the various constituencies of the MNE. Similarly, the degree 
of authority ceded to the subsidiary board is, like the parent company 
board, subject to the willingness of the shareholder(s) to cede control in 
order to secure the investments of other (here, local) contributors. 
This empirical evidence confirms Blair and Stout’s conclusion that 
contracting and coordination problems are at least as critical as agency 
problems within the MNE.141 Interestingly, the presence of the subsidiary 
board addresses both of these dimensions, facilitating both hierarchical 
control and horizontal coordination in the MNE network. On the one 
hand, a primary advantage of adopting the corporate form at the subsidi-
ary level is that the subsidiary board can serve as an intermediary be-
tween local stakeholders, other affiliates, and the central headquarters.142 
Active subsidiary boards—those with full local authority, to use Kiel et 
al.’s framework—are those most likely to serve as mediating hierarchs 
because of their greater autonomy.143 On the other hand, MNEs also use 
active subsidiary boards in order to strengthen internal organizational 
governance, in addition to or in lieu of personnel controls and executive 
compensation.144 The composition of the subsidiary board also reflects 
the extent of the parent’s need to mitigate agency concerns; for example, 
larger subsidiary boards or those with outside directors may provide 
                                                            
 138. Foss et al., supra note 50, at 251 (citations omitted). See also Stephen Young & Ana 
Teresa Tavares, Centralization and Autonomy: Back to the Future, 13 INT’L BUS. REV. 215, 227 
(2004) (noting that subsidiary roles and strategies may be either assigned by the parent or assumed 
by the subsidiary). 
 139. Julian Birkinshaw & Shameen Prashantham, Initiative in Multinational Subsidiaries, in 
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 155, 156 (Alain Verbeke 
et al. eds., 2012). Much of this literature focuses on foreign, rather than domestic subsidiaries, which 
may exhibit somewhat different patterns of autonomy and control. See id. 
 140. See generally Birkinshaw, supra note 66. 
 141. See Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 251–53. 
 142. See Menz et al., supra note 51, at 14. 
 143. See generally Du et al., supra note 94 (analyzing eighty-three Belgian subsidiaries of 
companies in fourteen countries). 
 144. Id. 
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more effective monitoring of subsidiary management and reduce agency 
costs.145 In more hierarchically structured MNEs, subsidiary boards may 
be subject to tighter agency controls and more direct vertical integration, 
while in flatter MNE structures, lateral relationships may dominate, with 
vertical controls playing a more limited role.146 
Although their embeddedness within the MNE means that team 
production problems can also emerge in wholly owned subsidiaries, cor-
porate law has not recognized the wholly owned subsidiary board as a 
mediating hierarch independent of its parent-shareholder. The issue does 
not readily present itself because parent companies are unlikely to sue an 
affiliate. However, the functional autonomy of many MNE subsidiaries 
suggests that their boards are in fact independent of their controlling 
shareholder(s).147 In contrast, corporate law in Delaware follows a strict 
principal–agent approach to the wholly owned subsidiary. For these sub-
sidiaries, shareholder primacy is effectively mandated, because courts 
have emphasized that these boards owe fiduciary duties to the parent 
corporation as the sole shareholder, and as a practical matter, the fiduci-
ary duties owed to the subsidiary itself can only be enforced by the par-
ent.148 State law here follows the guidance of the Supreme Court, which 
has held in the antitrust context that a parent corporation and its wholly 
owned subsidiary have a “complete unity of interests.”149 Nonetheless, it 
is possible that a subsidiary board formally under total equity control of 
its parent may perhaps serve as a mediating hierarch by virtue of its func-
tional role(s) within the MNE, the degree of autonomy reflected in its 
charter, and its implicit contract with its parent-shareholder. 
For non-wholly owned subsidiaries incorporated in Delaware, core 
common law principles work to ensure that Blair and Stout’s general 
                                                            
 145. Kim et al., supra note 127, at 55–57. If the subsidiary is publicly traded, local listing 
requirements may also mandate board independence. Id. 
 146. See Birkinshaw & Morrison, supra note 61, at 735–36, 738–39. 
 147. The findings surveyed here, however, derive primarily from research on foreign subsidiar-
ies. There is little information on the prevalence of functionally independent subsidiary boards 
among domestic subsidiaries. These should be more common in acquired subsidiaries rather than 
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 148. See, e.g., Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174 (Del. 
1988) (“[I]n a parent and wholly-owned subsidiary context, the directors of the subsidiary are obli-
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ers.”). See also Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, 906 A.2d 168, 200 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
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not owe any duty to the entity they serve. See, e.g., In re Scott Acquisition Corp., 344 B.R. 283, 
286–87 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (rejecting this interpretation). See also J. Haskell Murray, “Latchkey 
Corporations”: Fiduciary Duties in Wholly Owned, Financially Troubled Subsidiaries, 36 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 577, 593–600 & n.61–62 (2011) (surveying these authorities). 
 149. Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984). 
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claims about the independence of the mediating hierarch from the share-
holders also applies to subsidiary boards, even though controlled subsidi-
ary boards differ markedly from the super-independent monitoring 
boards that are mandated for public corporations.150 For example, com-
mon law fiduciary duties for the board of a subsidiary organized under 
Delaware law are no different from those of other corporations, and these 
duties run to the corporation (i.e., the subsidiary) and its shareholders.151 
The board’s functional independence from the controlling shareholder is 
bolstered by the controlling shareholder’s fiduciary duty to the minority, 
and by courts’ insistence on heightened entire fairness review in transac-
tions involving a controlling shareholder.152 The common law therefore 
clearly looks to non-wholly owned subsidiary boards to play the same 
mediating role within the MNE as the boards of the public corporations 
examined by Blair and Stout. 
One final, but important, issue is that, while the body responsible 
for oversight of the subsidiary and for mediating among the contributors 
to the subsidiary is its board, not all subsidiaries have a formal board, 
and not all boards may have the decisional authority necessary to serve 
as a mediating hierarch.153 In these cases, either the board at the parent or 
headquarters level, or senior management at the subsidiary level, may fill 
the mediating role for those levels below. Studies of subsidiary manage-
ment have observed that the subsidiary’s CEO or other top manager is 
often the key point of contact for the corporate headquarters and also has 
a significant effect on the subsidiary’s perception of, response to, and 
implementation of headquarters’ directives.154 Much of the literature on 
subsidiary initiative and influence within the MNE similarly emphasizes 
the effort of subsidiary managers in leveraging local resources, infor-
                                                            
 150. Their reduced independence may make them less effective at policing conflict of interest 
transactions that an outsider-dominated, part-time board is best suited to monitor. See generally 
Usha Rodrigues, A Conflict Primacy Model of the Public Board, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1051 (2013). 
 151. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (stating the general standard). See also 
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 152. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994) (explaining and 
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 153. See Luo, supra note 30, at 22–23 (noting variation in legal requirements for foreign sub-
sidiaries). Even under Delaware law, a nominal board may be appointed, and the corporate charter 
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See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2014). 
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mation, and innovation to gain resources or power within the MNE that 
benefit the subsidiary and its stakeholders.155 
Whether team production is mediated by a board or by management 
does not limit the applicability of the theory to subsidiaries. Early foun-
dations of team production theory contemplated that internal coordina-
tion and mediation among stakeholders would be achieved by an entre-
preneur or manager, not necessarily by a corporate board.156 Although 
Blair and Stout’s primary insight is that the corporate board is uniquely 
positioned to fulfill this role, they also recognize that this can be 
achieved to some extent by delegation to executives and managers, who 
are presumably equally subject to the parent’s control.157 In such cases, 
creditors and other participants in the business of the subsidiary will con-
tribute to the subsidiary with knowledge of the shareholder’s control and 
the subsidiary’s limited autonomy; if they are concerned about the ability 
of the controlling shareholder to withdraw capital from the subsidiary or 
otherwise impair their ability to share in the gains on their investment, 
they can protect their interests by contract.158 The effectiveness of the 
mediating hierarch may depend, then, on its perceived insulation from 
the shareholder, suggesting that independence and effectiveness are a 
matter of degree. This points, again, to the strategic and governance im-
plications of organizational form. 
IV. HETEROGENEITY IN MNE GOVERNANCE & THE CORPORATE 
OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
Another dimension of Blair and Stout’s work that poses a challenge 
to traditional corporate law theory is their conclusion that shareholder 
primacy is neither mandated nor supported by Delaware corporate law.159  
Because the board of directors is a mediating hierarch, its goal is to max-
imize “the joint welfare function” of the firm—that is, total firm value—
                                                            
 155. See, e.g., Birkinshaw et al., supra note 104, at 279 (noting the interplay between parent 
directives and managerial initiative). 
 156. For example, in Coase’s original account, a unitary entrepreneur provides the internal 
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note 33, at 388. 
 157. See Blair et al., supra note 36, at 275. 
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holder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 22 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 32 (2010) (arguing 
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and to motivate firm-specific contributions by all of the contributors to 
the corporate enterprise, not only its shareholders.160 
Defining the corporate objective function becomes complicated 
once we look into the MNE’s internal governance structure. In Delaware, 
for example, the directors and officers of a wholly owned subsidiary are 
obligated to serve the best interests of the parent-shareholder as well as 
the subsidiary.161 However, even in this case, maximizing shareholder 
(i.e., the immediate parent’s) value is not necessarily the same as maxim-
izing total firm or enterprise value. Nor is it inevitable that decisions 
maximizing subsidiary value will maximize firm or enterprise value. An 
obvious example is the case of a subsidiary whose sole role is to produce 
tax losses that will offset income elsewhere in the corporate structure.162 
Shareholder primacy is also at odds with the management literature on 
subsidiary formation, which suggests that in many large firms, the value-
added contribution of the subsidiary to the firm is precisely its ability to 
facilitate stakeholder engagement.163 
The orthodox justification for the priority that corporate law gives 
shareholder interests over other corporate constituents is that the share-
holders are residual claimants of the firm and not protected by other bod-
ies of law. This rationale is attenuated, if not moot, in the context of a 
controlled subsidiary. Because subsidiaries are subject to the direct or 
indirect control of other MNE affiliates, these affiliates can easily 
(though not costlessly) protect themselves by monitoring or by contract 
ex ante. Moreover, the choice to maintain a subsidiary rather than a divi-
sion represents a contract to obtain limited liability that will shield the 
parent from risk of loss.164 In fact, under Delaware law, the parent corpo-
ration of a wholly owned subsidiary has fewer incentives than the subsid-
iary’s employees and other constituents to maximize its value because 
the parent corporation is free, subject to dividend rules and other creditor 
protections, to exploit the resources of the wholly owned subsidiary for 
the parent’s benefit.165 
                                                            
 160. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 315. 
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Finally, because the MNE (which includes most publicly traded 
firms in the United States) spans jurisdictional boundaries, its various 
headquarters and subsidiaries will be subject to different corporate codes 
and listing standards, and shaped by different institutional structures and 
ownership patterns. These rules will all influence the explicit and implic-
it contracts of the firm. For example, boards under concentrated owner-
ship, as is common throughout Europe and Asia, are likely to be less in-
sulated from shareholders than they are under Delaware law. However, 
in most jurisdictions outside the United States, corporate governance 
rules obligate boards to weigh the interests of a broad range of stake-
holders.166 Accordingly, boards are not viewed solely as agents of the 
shareholders, but are required, as a matter of law, to serve as mediating 
hierarchs whose mission is to maximize the joint value of the firm as a 
whole.167 In order to retain their “social license” to operate, MNEs also 
face market pressures to demonstrate their commitment not only to the 
global stakeholders of the corporate headquarters, but also to the local 
stakeholders of global affiliates.168 Subsidiary boards play a critical role 
in engaging and responding to these local and global stakeholders.169 
From a comparative perspective then, a team production understanding 
                                                                                                                                     
ary to sell key assets to pay off the parent’s debt or for using the subsidiary’s assets to finance or 
offset the parent’s broader strategy). Similarly, the courts have applied business judgment rule defer-
ence to claims by subsidiary shareholders and creditors challenging a parent corporation’s use of 
subsidiary tax attributes without allocating value to the subsidiary. See generally McGovern, supra 
note 162 (reviewing this precedent). See also Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887 
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parent). 
 166. See, e.g., Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance 
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A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Govern-
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& Mark J. Roe eds., 2004). 
 168. See Salman Kimiagari et al., The Cooperation Complexity Rainbow: Challenges of Stake-
holder Involvement in Managing Multinational Firms, 22 INT’L J. BUS. MGMT. 50, 51–53, 57 (2013) 
(“The MNC as a whole needs to be concerned not only with its shareholders, but also the stakehold-
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specific contributions through the subsidiary. Others, such as local creditors, will make subsidiary-
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of the corporate board offers a better fit with corporate law guidelines in 
other jurisdictions that also extend beyond the Berle–Means firm. 
V. THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: A RESEARCH AGENDA 
Since 1999, when Team Production Theory was published, long-
standing debates on the nature and purpose of the corporation have taken 
center stage among policymakers and the broader public, as governments 
and business leaders have struggled to restore public confidence in cor-
porations. The past decade and a half has also witnessed major changes 
in the corporate governance landscape in the United States that may be 
leading to the demise of the Berle–Means firm. These developments do 
not, however, diminish team production theory’s force as a powerful ex-
planation of corporate law and of corporate boards.  
The first of these changes is the increased power of shareholders in 
corporate governance, through regulatory changes, such as proxy access, 
say on pay, and the elimination of broker nonvoting. These developments 
have occurred simultaneously with a decades-long shift toward more 
highly concentrated ownership among public firms. As a result, the for-
mal independence of board decisionmaking under the business judgment 
rule is increasingly constrained by various forms of shareholder voice 
and active engagement.170 Given these changes, the autonomy of public 
company boards, which were the initial focus of Team Production Theo-
ry, and of controlled boards within the MNE, now differs largely in de-
gree. Moreover, the examination here of the role of corporate boards 
within global firms suggests that the decline of the Berle–Means firm 
does not lessen the importance of corporate boards as mediating hier-
archs among the various constituencies of the firm.  
The second marked change in the corporate governance landscape 
is the continued proliferation of heterarchical governance structures with-
in large firms. Here too, this Article has demonstrated the continued ex-
planatory power of Blair and Stout’s work. Indeed, the dominance of the 
MNE as a complex organization cannot be explained without resort to 
team production theory. 
However, further research is needed at the intersections of organi-
zational management and corporate governance to explore how frequent-
ly firms utilize active boards in the domestic context, what factors influ-
ence that decision, and under what conditions active board governance at 
the subsidiary level adds value. Although wholly owned subsidiaries are 
presumably most widely used, broader evidence of the relative extent of 
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minority ownership might usefully inform understandings of domestic 
subsidiary roles. Similarly, little is known about the extent to which 
wholly owned subsidiaries incorporated in the United States take on re-
gional or global functional roles and the extent to which this level of re-
sponsibility correlates with the presence of active boards. 
The complexity, integration, and dynamism of MNEs, as well as 
their power and influence in economies and societies worldwide, also 
calls for renewed attention to identifying where the transformation of 
corporate structure matters in corporate and securities law. In other 
words, where do assumptions of hierarchy within the firm and of dyadic 
and uniform parent–subsidiary or headquarters–subsidiary relationships 
affect legal obligations? 
Compliance oversight is an obvious starting point. Team production 
explains that the joint output of the constituencies of the firm is greater 
than the sum of their respective inputs. If this is so, then joint outputs can 
include not only innovation, goods and services, employment, and capi-
tal, but can also include negative externalities that are greater because of 
the joint contributions across the firm.171 Public company boards are al-
ready under enhanced pressure from investors and regulators to engage 
in active, enterprise-wide monitoring and control over global compli-
ance, so these functions are more likely to be centralized within the firm 
and subject to the direct oversight of the corporate headquarters.  
However, the diffuse nature of information, innovation, and strate-
gy-setting in global firms means that efforts to charge headquarters 
boards, alone, with responsibility for operational oversight and risk man-
agement strategy will be inadequate and may actually be value-reducing 
to the firm.172 Because intrafirm, interunit relationships are just as critical 
as headquarters’ control in implementing global strategies,173 risk man-
agement and risk oversight obligations, as well as the implementation of 
many areas of direct regulation, are as likely to depend as much on sub-
sidiary governance as on the “tone from the top.” This also implies that 
shareholder derivative litigation, direct claims by other stakeholders, and 
regulatory enforcement action at the subsidiary level will continue to 
raise new jurisdictional challenges and require continued reliance on 
cross-border cooperation by regulators and courts. 
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A further conclusion is that subsidiary governance and autonomy 
are more important than state corporate law has previously recognized. 
Although full consideration of how corporate law might respond is be-
yond the scope of this Article, one possibility is that Delaware and other 
states might usefully distinguish between the fiduciary duties of corpo-
rate officers and directors in a way that recognizes the heightened re-
sponsibility of corporate officers, as some commentators have urged.174 
Because subsidiary boards tend to be composed, in part, of parent com-
pany officers, such a move would also require courts to more squarely 
address the obligation of all corporate directors and officers, even those 
on the board of a wholly owned subsidiary, to advance the interests of 
the corporation for whom they serve as trustee for—rather than agent 
of—their corporate parent. As firms move to adopt more complex struc-
tures, including matrix structures, dual reporting lines, functional special-
ization within individual subsidiaries, and the like, this shift in tone 
(though not in doctrine) would provide clarity for subsidiary directors 
who at present are left to balance the interests of the two.175  
Clearer guidance regarding the proper allegiance of subsidiary of-
ficers and directors might also encourage greater parent-level responsi-
bility for decisions that have competing effects on the subsidiary and the 
enterprise as a whole. Subsidiary directors and officers could then more 
effectively weigh the interests of their (controlling) shareholder(s) and 
other firm constituencies as other boards are permitted to do.176 As more 
U.S. firms are acquired by foreign firms, shift their headquarters abroad, 
or develop globally integrated decisionmaking structures, these questions 
may become more pressing. 
Moreover, if global firms cannot be viewed solely as principal–
agent chains governed from the top-down, but instead as part hierarchy, 
part heterarchy, then legal doctrine must even more directly confront 
how concepts of control or delegation influence the attribution of respon-
sibility and liability between subsidiaries and headquarters (or among 
subsidiaries). Agency law is certainly useful in resolving questions of 
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attribution from individual officers or employees to the entity. However, 
notions of control may become less relevant than they have been histori-
cally in grounding the liability of entities. More useful, perhaps, are ex-
isting doctrines that acknowledge collaboration, joint decisionmaking, 
and horizontal relationships, such as joint and several liability, aiding and 
abetting, and contributory negligence in civil cases, or accessory liability 
and conspiracy under criminal law. 
Finally, there have been a number of calls for MNEs to make exist-
ing disclosures regarding corporate structures more accessible to inves-
tors.177 Because much greater authority and power lies within the MNE 
than has previously been acknowledged, the public disclosure currently 
required under federal securities laws regarding the firm’s consolidated 
subsidiaries may not be presented in a way that adequately communi-
cates the effect of subsidiary governance on risk oversight and risk man-
agement. 
Since Team Production Theory was published, modern MNEs have 
evolved even more deeply into organizations where the coordinating, 
mediating, contractual role of corporate boards at all levels has become 
central to value creation. The scope of this Article does not permit the 
full consideration of new approaches within and beyond corporate law to 
better facilitate innovation and organizational change within the MNE. 
Its goal, instead, is to highlight some of the many areas where fundamen-
tal changes in the structure of global firms have legal consequence. The 
breadth and depth of team production across the MNE calls for further 
research investigating the role and impact of corporate governance within 
the MNE on overall firm value, firm-level decisionmaking, and regulato-
ry incentives. 
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